Georgia Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 1

Article 10

2018

If You (Pay to) Build it, They Will Come: Rethinking PubliclyFinanced Professional Sports Stadiums After the Atlanta Braves
Deal with Cobb County
Steven D. Zavodnick Jr.
University of Georgia School of Law, steven.zavodnick@uga.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Zavodnick, Steven D. Jr. (2018) "If You (Pay to) Build it, They Will Come: Rethinking Publicly-Financed
Professional Sports Stadiums After the Atlanta Braves Deal with Cobb County," Georgia Law Review: Vol.
53 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

If You (Pay to) Build it, They Will Come: Rethinking Publicly-Financed Professional
Sports Stadiums After the Atlanta Braves Deal with Cobb County
Cover Page Footnote
J.D., University of Georgia, 2018.

This note is available in Georgia Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss1/10

Zavodnick: If You (Pay to) Build it, They Will Come
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

12/18/2018 11:27 AM

IF YOU (PAY TO) BUILD IT, THEY WILL
COME: RETHINKING PUBLICLY-FINANCED
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS AFTER
THE ATLANTA BRAVES DEAL WITH COBB
COUNTY
Steven D. Zavodnick Jr.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 409
II. BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 411
A. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC FUNDING FOR PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS STADIUMS ........................................................ 411
B. THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NEW
STADIUMS ..................................................................... 413
C. THE BARGAINING ADVANTAGE TEAMS HAVE OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS ............................................................. 415
III. PUBLIC FINANCE LAW ............................................................ 416
A. THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION OF MUNICIPAL BONDS .... 417
B. STATE LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL BORROWING ............ 419
1. Avoiding Debt Limitation Clauses Through the Use
of Revenue Bonds ................................................... 420
2. Lending of Credit Doctrine .................................... 421
3. The Public Purpose Doctrine ................................. 422
4. Most Courts Have Upheld Stadium Subsidies
Against State Law Challenges............................... 422
5. The Massachusetts Approach ................................ 425
IV. THE BRAVES-COBB COUNTY STADIUM DEAL ......................... 427
A. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ..................................... 428
B. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN: FINANCING THE STADIUM WITH
TAXABLE MUNICIPAL BONDS ......................................... 431



J.D., University of Georgia, 2018.

407

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

1

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 10
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

408

12/18/2018 11:27 AM

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:407

C. THE LAWSUIT: SAVAGE V. STATE .....................................

433

V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO PROTECT TAXPAYERS ........................ 437
A. REMOVING THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION...................... 437
B. STATE LEGISLATION SETTING CLEAR STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC
INTEREST ......................................................................
C. MORE ROBUST JUDICIAL REVIEW ....................................

439
440

VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 441

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss1/10

2

Zavodnick: If You (Pay to) Build it, They Will Come
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

2018]

12/18/2018 11:27 AM

PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS

409

I. INTRODUCTION
“If you build it, they will come.” In the classic film Field of
Dreams,1 Iowa farmer Ray Kinsella heard a voice from the
heavens repeat this phrase while working his cornfield. On belief
alone, Ray plowed over his cornfield and built a baseball
diamond—risking financial ruin and bringing his sanity into
question. When all was almost lost, Ray’s faith was rewarded. The
ghosts of past baseball greats emerged from the cornfield to play
on Ray’s field, and he was able to “have a catch” with the ghost of
his long-dead ballplayer father.
Cobb County, Georgia (Cobb) pledged millions of dollars in
public money to build a new stadium for Major League Baseball’s
(MLB) Atlanta Braves (the Braves). The team opened the 2017
season at the brand-new SunTrust Park.2 Like Ray, Cobb has
undertaken significant financial risk in building the new ballpark.
To repay the $376 million in municipal bonds issued for the
stadium, Cobb must pay $22.4 million a year for the next thirty
years.3 Although Ray Kinsella’s risk in building a baseball field
paid off, it is doubtful that the new Braves stadium will live up to
the lofty promises made by Cobb politicians to justify the public
expenditure.
Professional sports stadiums have been subsidized with public
money since before Babe Ruth famously “called his shot.”4 While
the economic and legal merits of stadium subsidies have been
debated over the past fifty years, the scrutiny has intensified in
recent years from members of Congress, political commentators,
and sports journalists alike.5
FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
Tim Tucker, How Braves Will Honor Hank Aaron at SunTrust Park, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.ajc.com/sports/baseball/how-braves-will-honor-hankaaron-suntrust-park/bILuow4BWQTVReSD8Z7W0I/.
3 Dan Klepal, Cobb to Borrow $376 Million for SunTrust Park, ATL. J.-CONST. (Aug. 25,
2015),
http://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/cobb-borrow-376-million-for-suntrustpark/yEv6osd51CzK7YtuHWDVaO/. The payment will be offset to some degree by the
Braves’ $6.1 million in annual rent payments. Id.
4 See John Horne, The Babe’s Called Shot, BASEBALL HALL OF FAME (last visited Dec.
19, 2016), http://baseballhall.org/archive-collection/called-shot (chronicling the 1932 World
Series game when Babe Ruth pointed his bat beyond the outfield wall before hitting a home
run); infra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that the first professional sports team
played in a publicly-funded stadium in 1932).
5 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 3684 (2017) (proposing to eliminate
the federal tax exemption given to municipal bonds issued to finance stadiums); HBO, Any
1
2
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For several reasons, the Braves’ new stadium is a fascinating
case study through which to analyze the current legal framework
that enables and encourages municipalities to gift privately owned
teams millions of dollars in public money to build stadiums. Like
most publicly-funded stadiums, the Braves’ stadium construction
was financed with the proceeds from municipal bonds. Unlike
other stadium bonds, however, the interest collected by SunTrust
Park bonds are not exempt from federal income taxation.6
Additionally, the bonds’ validity was upheld by the Georgia
Supreme Court against numerous Georgia constitutional and
statutory challenges.7 And lastly, the project exposed how
inadequate statutory safeguards can result in significant public
backlash.8
Section II of this Note provides a brief history of publiclyfinanced stadiums, evaluates the claims that stadiums are worthy
public investments, and explains how teams’ bargaining
advantage over municipalities resulted in an oversupply of public
funds for stadium construction. Section III examines federal and
state law implicated by using municipal bonds to subsidize
stadiums. Section IV analyzes the agreement between the CobbMarietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall Authority (the Authority), the
Braves, and Cobb County and concludes that: (1) the agreement
was structured to evade the Georgia constitutional and statutory
limitations on municipal debt; (2) the decision to issue taxable,
instead of tax-exempt, bonds likely saved Cobb money, which
illustrates the perverse incentives federal tax law impose on local
governments; and (3) although correctly decided from precedent,
the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Savage v. State ignores
the plain meaning and historical purpose of state constitutional
protections intended to prevent municipalities from lending public
funds for projects that result in predominately private gains.9
Given Wednesday with Bill Simmons ‘I Believe’ Promo (HBO), YOUTUBE (May 14, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1dGNbtHdV8 (“I believe that billionaires should pay
for their own . . . stadiums.”); Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television
broadcast July 12, 2015) (criticizing stadium subsidies).
6 See infra Section III.A (considering the federal tax exemption generally); infra Section
IV.A (analyzing Cobb’s decision to issue taxable bonds).
7 See Savage v. State, 774 S.E.2d 624, 1627 (Ga. 2015) (discussed infra Section IV.C).
8 See Dan Klepal, Cobb Approves Major Braves Stadium Agreements, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (May 27, 2014), http://www.myajc.com/news/cobb-approves-major-braves-stadiumagreements/VlgOPijPkz6hyKurCvZ9dL/ (discussing the public opposition to the stadium).
9 Savage, 774 S.E.2d at 634.
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To prevent the continued oversupply of stadium subsidies, in
Section V this Note endorses the pending federal legislation that
would revoke stadium bonds’ tax exemption. It also advocates for
state legislation that would create procedural and substantive
standards to rein in local governments’ tendency to capitulate to
team owners at the expense of the taxpaying public. Finally,
courts, recognizing that publicly funded stadiums are unlike other
government facilities, should take a more active role in reviewing
proposed stadium bonds to ensure that they are for a public
purpose and not just gratuitous public aid to private enterprise.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC FUNDING FOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
STADIUMS

In the early days of American professional sports, games were
played in venues paid for by the home team’s owners.10 Beginning
in 1923, however, the cities of Los Angeles, Chicago, and Cleveland
spent public money to construct large coliseums to bolster their
chances of hosting the Olympic Games.11 All three cities’ initial
efforts failed, and while Los Angeles was eventually awarded the
1932 Games,12 Chicago and Cleveland were left with vacant
stadiums. The best, and perhaps only, solution was to offer the
stadiums to local professional teams, which Cleveland did by
renting the stadium to MLB’s Indians.13
Until 1960, however, publicly funded stadiums were the
exception and not the rule.14 Post-World War II social and
economic conditions profoundly affected the business of
professional sports.15 Because of this rapid growth, it became
10 See Logan E. Gans, Take Me Out to the Ball Game, But Should the Crowd’s Taxes Pay
for It?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 751, 754 (2010) (noting that famous ballparks, such as Fenway Park
and Wrigley Field, were built entirely with private funds).
11 Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationships between Major League
Sports and Government, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Apr. 5, 1999 at 4.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Build the Stadium—Create the Jobs!, SPORTS,
JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 2 (Roger G. Noll
& Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997).
15 See id. at 2–3 (discussing how population migration from the Northeast to the Sunbelt,
cheaper long-distance travel, and rapid revenue growth increased the value of professional
leagues and made it viable for teams to exist in more American cities).
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imperative for major cities to retain or attract professional
teams.16 Although local governments went about this in several
ways, the most fruitful was to “dangl[e] the prospect of a publicly
financed stadium . . . .”17 Milwaukee was the first to use this
strategy. Unable to secure an MLB expansion franchise, the city
built a new stadium entirely with public funds.18 The stadium was
able to lure the Braves franchise to Milwaukee in 1953.19 And
while two other MLB teams moved to take advantage of publicly
financed stadiums in other cities shortly thereafter,20 it was the
Brooklyn Dodgers’ departure for Los Angeles in 1958 that truly
accelerated the frenzy of new stadium construction.21
Before 1948, there were only twenty-eight professional sports
stadiums and only four were built with a modest amount of
government funds.22 Over the next half of the twentieth century,
American sports teams spent over $20 billion on stadiums for the
four major American sports leagues of which, conservatively,
taxpayers paid $14.727 billion.23 During that time, stadium
construction changed dramatically.24 The stadiums of the 1960s
and 1970s were “cookie-cutter, concrete-slab” facilities that were
often home to both baseball and football teams.25 Today, teams
demand sport-specific stadiums with a bevy of modern amenities,
and are increasingly declaring that their facilities are obsolete.26

16 See Gans, supra note 11, at 755 (“[G]reat competition for both established teams and
expansion teams ensued between many cities.”).
17 Id.
18 Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’ Demands
for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2008).
19 Id.
20 See id. at 40 (noting that the Browns and Athletics left privately owned stadiums and
markets shared with another team for solo markets and publicly-funded stadiums).
21 See id. at 41 (“Once [the Dodgers moved] to Los Angeles, MLB owners became
cognizant of a basic tenet in economics: the law of supply and demand.”).
22 Zachary A. Phelps, Stadium Construction for Professional Sports: Reversing the
Inequities Through Tax Incentives, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. L. COMM. 981, 983–84 (2004).
23 See Keating, supra note 11, at 11–15 (converting nominal expenditures into real 1997
dollars).
24 See Edelman, supra note 18, at 43–44 (noting the sharp increase in costs to build a
new stadium).
25 Gans, supra note 10, at 755 (internal quotations omitted).
26 Edelman, supra note 18, at 44–45. Stadium revenues are a vital part of a team’s
business model, and new stadiums generally lead to increased attendance and allow teams
to justify charging fans higher ticket and concessions prices. Frank A. Mayer III, Stadium
Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 195, 198 (2005).
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Given the leverage teams hold over local governments, this has
resulted in an increase in the number of new stadiums being
built,27 each carrying a higher price tag.28 While the percentage of
the total construction costs paid with public funds is less than it
was in the 1950s, the total public investment is higher than ever
before because of the number of new stadiums being built and the
increase in the price per stadium.29 Since 2000, forty-five stadiums
were constructed or majorly renovated at the staggering cost of
$27.8 billion, of which nearly $13 billion (in 2014 dollars) was
financed with public money.30
B. THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NEW STADIUMS

Although the aggregate $13 billion public investment in
stadiums since the turn of the century is an attention grabbing
figure, subsidy proponents argue that the public expenditure is
warranted because stadiums spur economic growth, job creation,
and increase tax revenues.31 Local politicians and team owners
produce “independent” economic analyses ahead of every new
stadium proposal. Invariably, these studies predict an influx of
money into the local economy attributable to the stadium.32
Advocates also rely on cherry-picked statistics to show positive
economic outcomes allegedly attributable to the stadium. For
27 See Edelman, supra note 18, at 44 (showing the steady increase in the number of new
facilities being built in each decade since 1950).
28 See TED GAYER ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., TAX-EXEMPT MUNICIPAL BONDS AND THE
FINANCING OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS 23 (2016) (stating that the total cost to
build new Yankee Stadium, completed in 2009, was over $2.5 billion); Edelman, supra note
18, at 43–44 (providing representative examples to show how the cost to build a new
stadium has increased over the years).
29 See Edelman, supra note 18, at 43 (“[L]ocal communities are paying more than ever
before to build sports facilities.”).
30 GAYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 23.
31 Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on
Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-Events?, 5 ECON. J. WATCH 294, 300
(2008).
32 See Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums:
Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW J. 173, 201 (2002) (quoting a consultant who advises
local governments on stadium issues as saying that “for each $1 spent on pro sports, an
additional $1.75 is created in the economy . . . and for each $1 million spent on pro sports,
76 jobs are created.”); see also, e.g., BRAILSFORD & DUNLAVEY, SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC
AND FISCAL BENEFITS OF A MLB TEAM AND NEW BALLPARK TO COBB COUNTY,
https://cobbcounty.org/images/documents/communications/CobbCountyFinalBenefitsStudy.p
df (touting the anticipated economic benefits from the Braves stadium in an “independent”
study commissioned by the Cobb County Chamber of Commerce).
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example, a 1998 study conducted by the City of Phoenix attributed
a one-year 34% increase in downtown sales revenue to a newly
constructed baseball stadium.33
Contrary to the economic impact studies commissioned by
stadium proponents—what two economists derisively call
“promotional literature”34—the weight of independent economic
research shows negligible long-term economic stimulus from new
stadium construction.35 For example, using a regression model, one
economist concluded that there was no statistically significant
evidence that professional sports teams or stadiums positively
impact income per capita or employment.36 To explain the
empirical findings, economists note that consumer spending on
professional sports comes out of local residents’ fixed
entertainment budget. Further, administrative and opportunity
costs associated with stadium subsidies are generally not
addressed in the “promotional literature.”37
Backers of stadium projects also argue that professional sports
franchises are cultural assets that increase civic pride and bring
national attention to the community. This reasoning has been
endorsed by some courts.38 These intangible benefits, however, are
impossible to quantify.39 And, like tangible economic benefits,
must be assessed while keeping in mind opportunity costs and
substitution effects because, for every resident who derives benefit
from the stadium, there are citizens who are disinterested in
sports and may resent paying taxes to subsidize the stadium.40

Goodman, supra note 32, at 201.
Coates & Humphreys, supra note 31, at 300.
35 See id. at 310 (surveying the work of several economists to conclude that there is “near
unanimity in the conclusion that stadiums . . . have no consistent, positive impact on jobs,
income, and tax revenues.”).
36 Id. at 303 (citing Robert Baade, Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan
Economic Development, 18 J. URB. AFF. 12, 14 (1996)).
37 See id. at 299 (“Government expenditures on stadium and arena subsidies carry
opportunity costs which are never addressed.”).
38 See, e.g., Poe v. Hillsborough Cty., 695 So. 2d 672, 678–79 (Fla. 1997) (citing “national
media exposure” and “civic pride and camaraderie” as a few of the stadium’s public
benefits).
39 GAYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 5–6.
40 Coates & Humphreys, supra note 31, at 299.
33
34
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C. THE BARGAINING ADVANTAGE TEAMS HAVE OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS

Professional sports leagues are exempt from federal antitrust
laws.41 In what would otherwise be an illegal restraint on trade,
leagues can block otherwise qualified franchises from joining.42
Additionally, start-up leagues face prohibitively high barriers to
challenge existing leagues.43 Because of this, some American
communities that want and could support a pro team are left
without.44 Moreover, a Ninth Circuit decision in the 1980s
sanctioned the unilateral power of individual franchises to
relocate.45 The result is that American cities find themselves in a
classic prisoner’s dilemma. Either the local government gives into
the team’s demand for a subsidized stadium, or it runs the risk
that another city will—leading to the team’s departure.46 San
Diegans discovered this hard lesson recently. After voters refused
to approve public money to build a new stadium,47 the Chargers
announced they were moving to Los Angeles to be a co-tenant in a
new stadium.48

41 See Jacob M. Ware, Intentional Pass: Analyzing Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption as
Applied to Broadcasting Agreements in Laumann v. National Hockey League, 49 GA. L. REV.
895, 901 (2015) (“[B]aseball has enjoyed a longstanding judicially created exemption to
antitrust laws since a famous Supreme Court case in 1922.”).
42 See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 571–72 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), aff’d 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that the NFL’s rejection of a franchise
application did not violate Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act); see also Edelman, supra note
18, at 62–63 (arguing that removing the exemption might limit stadium subsidies).
43 See Edelman, supra note 18, at 48–49 (citing the four major sports leagues’
“insurmountable lead” in fan base, talent, broadcasting rights, and facilities).
44 See id. at 48 (citing examples of major American cities that lack a team in one or more
of the four major sports leagues).
45 See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381,
1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the NFL could not prevent one of its franchises from
relocating); see also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414 (1985)
(preventing the city from using its eminent domain power to block the team’s departure).
46 See Goodman, supra note 32, at 210 (discussing the prisoner’s dilemma facing
municipalities and why it almost always makes sense to offer a subsidy).
47 Ken Belson, San Diego Voters Reject Funding of New Chargers Stadium, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/sports/football/san-diego-rejectschargers-stadium.html.
48 Nathan Fenno, What Could a Chargers Lease at the Rams’ Inglewood Stadium Look
Like?, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-live-nfl-meetingschargers-what-could-a-chargers-lease-at-the-1481731431-htmlstory.html.
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III. PUBLIC FINANCE LAW
Local governments have several policy tools at their disposal to
subsidize stadiums. These include direct payments for site
preparation and infrastructure improvements,49 tax breaks,50 and
the use of eminent domain to acquire the stadium site.51 But the
most common tool is the use of tax-exempt municipal bonds.52 In a
typical arrangement, a municipality will utilize another
governmental entity—either a special fund, district, or authority—
to issue the debt and own the stadium.53 The debt issued by the
quasi-governmental entity is then paid back with a mix of tax
dollars remitted to the authority by the municipality and rent paid
by the team.54
A. THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION OF MUNICIPAL BONDS

Interest earned on state and municipal debt obligations has
been excluded from federal taxation since the first income tax was
passed in 1913.55 The rule is now codified at section 103(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.56 Because investors do not pay taxes on
their earned interest, tax-exempt municipal bonds are, all other
49 See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 14, at 7 (“The standard practice is for local and
sometimes state government to pay for most, if not all, site preparation.”).
50 See Gans, supra note 10, at 764 (“An abatement of property taxes is one major tool
used by cities to lure or keep teams.”); see also Jack F. Williams et al., Public Financing of
Green Cathedrals, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 123, 133 (2012) (noting that property tax
abatements have term limits so some jurisdictions have issued payment in lieu of taxes
(PILOT) bonds instead).
51 See generally Cristin Hartzog, The Public Use of Private Sports Stadiums: Kelo Hits a
Homerun for Private Developers, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 145 (2006) (discussing the
evolution of and controversy around using eminent domain to acquire land for stadiums).
52 See Goodman, supra note 32, at 174, 176 (calling the practice “pervasive”).
53 See id. (discussing common financing mechanisms).
54 See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 14, at 13–14 (listing various sources of revenue used
to repay the municipal bond).
55 Dennis Zimmerman, Subsidizing Stadiums: Who Benefits, Who Pays?, in SPORTS,
JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 134 (Roger G.
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). At first, the exemption was premised on the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which prohibits the federal government from
taxing the states, and vice versa. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586
(1895) (holding that a tax on state bond interest was unconstitutional because it amounted
to an indirect tax on the states). But this decision was later overruled. See South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525–26 (1998) (determining that taxing interest earned by individuals
from state bonds does not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine).
56 See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“[G]ross income [for tax purposes] does not include interest
on any State or local bond.”).
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things being equal, more attractive investments than
conventional, taxable bonds.57 This enables municipalities to
borrow at lower interest rates, which reduces the total cost to
taxpayers over the life of the obligation.58 The federal government
effectively subsidizes this advantage for local governments
through uncollected taxes.59
Congress removed tax-exempt status from certain municipal
bonds. 60 The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 made
municipal bonds taxable if more than 25% of the proceeds were
used for the benefit of a private entity and secured by property
used by a private entity.61 This law, however, excluded bonds used
to build “sports facilities.”62
Troubled by the proliferation of municipal financings to build
professional sports stadiums—and the resulting federal revenue
loss63—Congress inserted provisions into the Tax Reform Act of
1986 to “eliminate tax-exempt financing of professional sports
facilities.”64 The law removed the “sports facilities” exclusion,65
defined municipal bonds that overwhelmingly benefit private
enterprise as “private activity” bonds,66 and lowered the threshold

57 See Zimmerman, supra note 55, at 130 (noting the “interest rate spread (differential)
between long-term taxable corporate bonds and long-term tax-exempt state and local
bonds”); see also GAYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 10–11 (arguing that corporate bonds
provide the best taxable comparison to tax-free municipal bonds). Since 1996, the interest
rate spread has declined from 2% to approximately 0.5%. Id. at 27.
58 GAYER ET AL., supra note 28, at 3 (calculating that cumulative savings for issuers of
stadium bonds between 2000 and 2014 because of the federal tax-exemption to be between
$2.6 billion and $3.2 billion depending on the discount rate used to discount future
payments back to present value).
59 See id. at 3 (estimating the present value of the federal revenue loss from stadium
bonds issued between 2000 and 2014 to be between $3.2 billion and $3.7 billion).
60 See Williams et al., supra note 50, at 130–31 (indicating that Congress passed the law
out of concern that tax-exempt revenue bonds were driving up interest rates, calculating tax
revenue loss, and giving state and local government officials too much control over a federal
tax expenditure).
61 Williams et al., supra note 50, at 131.
62 Id.
63 See Gans, supra note 10, at 757 (internal quotations omitted) (attributing the backlash
that developed in the 1970s and 80s to the “explosive growth” of using tax-exempt
municipal debt to finance stadiums for wealthy owners and the resulting revenue loss
suffered by the federal treasury).
64 Goodman, supra note 32, at 182 (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. S6306 (June 14, 1996)
(statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan)).
65 I.R.C. § 142(a) (2012).
66 I.R.C. § 103(b)(1).
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amount of private use to 10%.67 Now, a bond issuance is considered
a private activity bond, and is therefore taxable, if more than 10%
of the bond proceeds are used by a private business (the private
use test) and more than 10% of the debt service is secured by
property used for a private business or through payments for
property used for a private business use (the private payment
test).68
With $13 billion in proceeds from tax-exempt municipal bonds
used to subsidize professional sports stadiums since 2000,69 it is
clear that the 1986 law has failed to live up its stated purpose. 70
Quite to the contrary, the law weakened the bargaining position of
municipalities in negotiations with professional teams.71 To avoid
the private activity bond classification and the resulting forfeiture
of tax-exempt status, local taxpayers are forced to shoulder at least
90% of the debt repayment from revenues unrelated to the
stadium.72 Several legislative efforts have attempted to change the
law,73 including an early version of the tax reform bill passed in
late 2017.74 But the bill passed into law by President Trump left
the tax-exemption for stadium bonds intact.75
B. STATE LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL BORROWING

In the middle of the nineteenth century, public animosity
towards public aid to private corporations (primarily railroads) led
states across the country to limit state legislatures “unbridled
I.R.C. § 141(b).
Id.
69 See supra note 31and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71 See Goodman, supra note 33, at 183 (finding the bills effects “ironic”).
72 Id. at 185; see also Gans, supra note 10, at 758 (“[T]he 1986 Tax Reform Act actually
made stadiums more likely to be funded with public tax money unrelated to the
stadium . . . .”).
73 See, e.g., Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, S. 952, 106th
Cong. (1999) (expanding sports leagues’ antitrust exemption so long as stadiums are not
publicly-financed); Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, S. 224, 106th Cong. § (a)(1)
(1996) (classifying local bonds as private activity bonds if more than 5% or $5 million of the
proceeds are used “to provide professional sports facilities”).
74 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 3604 (2017).
75 Kathryn Watson, Tax Bill Includes Breaks for Things Trump has Railed Against—
Like NFL Stadiums, C.B.S. NEWS, (Dec. 21, 2017) (nothing that the final bill preserved the
“tax break for the construction of sports stadiums”); see also Goodman, supra note 32, at 218
(discussing the various constituencies that oppose changing the tax code to eliminate the
subsidy).
67
68
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power to use the public’s assets for the benefit of private
corporations.”76 Many states, including Georgia, amended their
constitutions to limit state and local politicians’ power to incur
debt without voter approval and to prohibit lending state credit to
private enterprise.77 Around the same time, courts created the
public purpose doctrine “to insure that public monies be spent
solely for public purposes and not to benefit private business.”78
While these doctrines were applied vigorously around the turn of
the twentieth century, modern courts have been hesitant to use
them to check legislative power.79 Stadium bond issuances are
regularly challenged on the grounds that they violate the debt
limitation clause, lending of credit doctrine, or public purpose
doctrine, but courts have generally declined to grant judicial relief
to stadium subsidy opponents.80
1. Avoiding Debt Limitation Clauses Through the Use of Revenue
Bonds.
As with stadium subsidies today, state and municipal debt were
the primary vehicles for governments to subsidize private business
in the nineteenth century.81 Debt limitation clauses were enacted
to limit or, in some cases, completely proscribe municipal
borrowing.82 Georgia’s law limits the debt incurred by political
subdivisions to (i) 10% of the total assessed value of all taxable
property within the jurisdiction and (ii) requires that any new debt
be approved by a majority of voters.83 While both the cap on total
indebtedness and the vote requirement would seemingly impose
76 Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams – A Constitutional Disgrace:
The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting
Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 397–99 (1999).
77 Id. at 393.
78 Id.
79 See id. at 394 (arguing that modern courts ignore the historical purposes and clear
wording of these state constitutional provisions, which amounts to “a constitutional
disgrace”).
80 See Edelman, supra note 18, at 57 (“Courts . . . have rarely applied these doctrines
against the building of public sports facilities.”); see also infra Section III.B.4 (analyzing
case law where courts have upheld stadium subsidies against state constitutional
challenges).
81 See Rubin, supra note 76, at 395 (describing the massive public debt incurred “for the
purpose of giving financial aid to private corporations to build canals and railroads.”).
82 Goodman, supra note 32, at 177.
83 GA. CONST. art. 9, § 5, para. 1(a) (2016); see also GA. CONST. art. 7, § 4, paras. 1, 2
(imposing similar requirements on the state government).
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vital checks on a municipality’s capacity to issue stadium bonds,84
in practice they are easily evaded.85 The debt limitation clause
only applies to bonds secured by the full faith and credit of the
issuing government86—known as general obligations bonds—and
not bonds secured by revenues from the project being undertaken
or monies paid into a special fund—known as revenue bonds.87 The
“special fund doctrine” says that a “financial obligation payable
solely from a dedicated source of revenue, and not general taxes, is
not treated as a debt for the purposes of constitutional debt
limitations . . . .”88 In Georgia, the doctrine became law with a
ruling by the state Supreme Court,89 which the Revenue Bond Law
later codified.90
Since the 1960s, local governments have relied almost
exclusively on revenue bonds to finance stadiums.91 Payments to
retire the debt can come from stadium revenues, indirectly related
sources of revenue such as sales or hotel occupancy taxes, or from
general tax revenues.92 However, as discussed in the preceding
section, federal tax law creates incentives to limit the amount paid
from private uses of the stadium to no more than 10% of the debt
security.93
2. Lending of Credit Doctrine.

84 See, e.g., Belson, supra note 47 (discussing how voters in San Diego County rejected
the referendum that would have approved public funds for a new football stadium). But see
Rodney Fort, Direct Democracy and the Stadium Mess, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 149 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist
eds., 1997) (arguing that direct democracy often fails to express the median voter’s
preferences on the amount of public spending on stadiums).
85 See Goodman, supra note 32, at 177–78 (describing how local governments can avoid
the debt limitation clause by issuing the bonds through special districts, special funds, or
public authorities).
86 See id. at 177 (explaining that when a government pledges its full faith and credit, it is
pledging to use its taxing power, if necessary, to repay the obligation).
87 Id. at 178.
88 JAMES P. MONACELL, GEORGIA PUBLIC FINANCE LAW HANDBOOK 22 (2d ed. 2015).
89 See Wright v. Hardwick, 109 S.E. 903, 906 (Ga. 1921) (holding that certain warrants,
which appeared to be debts, were not debts for constitutional purposes because “the
holders . . . would have no recourse against the state on the warrants themselves . . . .”).
90 O.C.G.A. §§ 36-82-60 to 36-82-85 (2012).
91 See Goodman, supra note 32, at 177 (“It is the issuance of [revenue bonds] that has
become popular in recent decades in the milieu of stadium financing.”).
92 Mayer III, supra note 26, at 208.
93 See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
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While debt limitation clauses reflect public distrust of
government’s ability to control borrowing and spending generally,
94 the lending of credit doctrine focuses squarely on limiting
government aid to private enterprise. Forty-six states, including
Georgia, have enacted such measures to prevent the “mischief”
that arises in business partnerships between municipalities and
private corporations and to “forbid[ ] the union of public and
private capital.”95 Georgia’s provision, which is representative, is
as follows: “[No] county, municipality, or other political subdivision
of this state, through taxation, contribution, or otherwise, [shall]
appropriate money for or to lend its credit to any person or to any
nonpublic corporation or association . . . .”96 Applying the plain
meaning of this prohibition to stadium subsidies, it seems obvious
that contributing public money to repay bonds issued to construct
a stadium for a privately-owned sports team would violate the
lending of credit doctrine, but modern courts have disagreed.97
3. The Public Purpose Doctrine.
Although now codified in some states’ constitutions,98 the public
purpose doctrine began as a judicially-created rule.99 The rule,
which states that public money can only be spent for public
purposes,100 seems intuitive, but until the mid-nineteenth century
legislatures could tax, borrow, and spend “for every purpose
deemed by them legitimate.”101 Related to the public purpose
doctrine is what is known as Dillon’s rule on the limits of power.
The rule, which is regarded as a fundamental principle of local
government law, limits local governments’ powers to those
expressly granted to them by the state legislature or necessarily

Rubin, supra note 76, at 397–98.
Id. at 412, 414 (citing Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 54 (Ohio 1871)).
96 See GA. CONST. art. 9, § 2, para. 8 (2016); see also GA. CONST. art. 7, § 4, para. 8
(imposing the same limitation on the state). But see Bradfield v. Hosp. Auth. Of Muskogee
Cty., 176 S.E.2d 92, 101 (Ga. 1970) (determining that the lending of credit doctrine does not
apply to public authorities).
97 See infra Section III.B.4.
98 See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through amendments approved
Nov. 3, 2015) (“Taxes . . . shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.”).
99 Rubin, supra note 76, at 417.
100 Id.
101 Commonwealth v. M’Williams, 11 Pa. (1 Jones) 61, 71 (1849).
94
95
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implied from the granting legislation.102 Both the public purpose
doctrine and Dillon’s rule have been adopted by judicial decree in
Georgia.103 Taken together, municipalities may only issue bonds
for public purposes that they are expressly authorized to
undertake by law.104
4. Most Courts Have Upheld Stadium Subsidies Against State Law
Challenges.
Despite the plain meaning and historical reasons for their
enactment, the debt limitation clause, lending of credit doctrine,
and public purpose rule have failed to prevent state and municipal
governments from bestowing billions of taxpayer dollars on
privately-owned professional sports teams to build stadiums. The
case law validating the use of municipal bonds to finance stadiums
is immense, but three cases decided within a year of each other
exemplify the majority view.105
By structuring stadium bonds as revenue bonds, local
governments avoid state debt limitation clauses and, therefore, the
referendum requirement. In Libertarian Party v. State, the
stadium bonds did not implicate Wisconsin’s debt limitation clause
because the issuing special district could only assess sales and use
taxes, which were then placed into a special fund.106 The court
distinguished bonds payable from general property taxes and
bonds payable from other tax revenues placed into a special fund—
the former being subject to the debt limitation clause while the
latter is not.107 Because the bonds met the statutory requirements,

102 MONACELL, supra note 88, at 29 (citing Beazley v. DeKalb Cty., 77 S.E.2d 240, 242
(Ga. 1953)).
103 See Smith v. State, 150 S.E.2d 868, 870 (Ga. 1966) (holding that “bonds must be issued
for a public purpose.”); Beazley, 77 S.E.2D AT 242 (“[C]ounties and municipal corporations
can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law . . . .”).
104 MONACELL, supra note 88, at 29.
105 See Poe v. Hillsborough Cty., 695 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 1997) (reversing the trial
court’s invalidation of stadium bonds); CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Wash. 1996)
(upholding legislation “that provides a means of financing the construction of a publicly
owned major league baseball stadium); Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 440
(Wis. 1996) (determining that a state law authorizing the formation of special district to
build and maintain a professional baseball park was constitutional).
106 Libertarian Party, 546 N.W.2d at 437.
107 See id. at 436–37 (analogizing stadium bonds to other obligations that do not “create
an indebtedness”).
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the debt limitation clause was not invoked and a referendum was
not required.108
In addition to evading the debt limitation clause, using a public
authority or special fund can effectively sterilize state lending of
credit doctrines. In many states, “the legislature has the power to
create local units of government which are not subject to the same
constitutional restrictions as the state.”109 This proposition was
used to conclude that the state lending of credit did not apply to
the baseball park district.110 Moreover, the state’s “moral
obligation” to repay the bonds if the special district defaulted did
not pledge the state’s credit because it was not a contractual
obligation even though the state acknowledged that, if called upon,
they would use their full taxing power to backstop the bonds.111
The Washington Supreme Court employed a two-pronged test to
determine whether the stadium bonds violated the lending of
credit doctrine.112 First, it asked whether the public funds were
spent to further a fundamental purpose of government. While it
concluded that constructing a baseball stadium was for a public
purpose, it did not rise to the level of a fundamental purpose of
government.113 Because the stadium bonds did not pass the first
prong, the court moved to the second.114 The court analyzed the
consideration the public received for the expenditure and asked
whether there was donative intent.115 Rejecting the plaintiff’s
contention that the state was acting as a “financing conduit for
private enterprise,”116 the court concluded that the lending of
credit doctrine was not violated because the stadium site was to

Id. at 437.
Id. at 438–39; see also, e.g., Bradfield v. Hosp. Auth. of Muskogee Cty., 176 S.E.2d 92,
101 (Ga. 1970) (holding that the lending of credit doctrine does not apply to political
subdivisions in Georgia).
110 Id. at 439.
111 See id. at 440 (concluding that this type of commitment does not pledge state credit
but merely expresses the legislature’s intention to make necessary appropriations to further
the legislation’s objectives).
112 CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1061 (Wash. 1996).
113 Id. at 1061–62.
114 See id. at 1061 (“The second prong comes into play only when the expenditures are
held to not serve fundamental purposes of government.”).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1062 (internal quotations omitted).
108
109
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remain state owned and the lease agreement with the professional
team was not for nominal rent.117
The Florida Supreme Court in Poe explained the judiciary’s role
in the revenue bond process.118 Many states require revenue bonds
to be validated by the courts.119 But this review is generally
limited.120 The trial court in Poe exceeded the permissible scope of
judicial review by conditioning the stadium bond’s validation on an
amendment to the professional football team’s lease agreement
that granted the team the right to receive the first $2 million in
annual revenue from non-football events.121 The court suggested
that this type of micromanagement and second-guessing of an
arms-length business deal is what the limited scope of judicial
review is intended to prevent.122
All three decisions deferred to the legislature’s determination
that the stadium bonds furthered a public purpose.123 When courts
do analyze the substantive merits of the claim that stadiums are
for a public purpose, they tend to focus on both the purported
tangible economic benefits and non-tangible benefits to the
community. The Wisconsin court approved the legislature’s
declaration that the stadium would encourage economic
development and tourism, reduce unemployment, and bring
needed capital into the state.124 It also endorsed the stadium’s
public purpose because of the “important part that professional
sports plays in our social life.”125 Similarly, the Florida court
117 See id. (noting that if the governmental authority should “permit the ball club to play
its games in the stadium for only nominal rent, then the constitutional prohibitions against
a gift of state funds might be implicated.”).
118 Poe v. Hillsborough Cty., 695 So. 2d 672, 675 (Fla. 1997).
119 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 36-82-73 (2012) (“All revenue bonds . . . shall be validated in the
superior court . . . .”).
120 See Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675 (limiting judicial review to the issuer’s authority, the
obligation’s legal purpose, and compliance with other legal requirements).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 679.
123 See id. at 678–79 (giving substantial weight to testimony of local government officials
regarding the anticipated economic benefits to be derived from the stadium); CLEAN v.
State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1059 (Wash. 1996) (deferring to the legislature’s judgment even if the
public purpose is debatable); Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 435 (Wis. 1996)
(internal quotations omitted) (“[L]egislative determinations of public purpose should be
overruled only if it . . . is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.”) (quoting State ex rel
Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 1973)).
124 Libertarian Party, 546 N.W.2d at 434.
125 Id. (quoting Lifteau v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Minn.
1978)).
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accepted the local government’s claim that the stadium would
yield an economic benefit in excess of $300 million.126 Additionally,
the stadium served the public purpose by instilling “civic pride and
camaraderie,” as well as “enhancing the community image on a
nationwide basis.”127 On a final note about the public purpose
doctrine, the prevailing view is that the public purpose is not
defeated because the project will also confer substantial private
benefits to the team.128
5. The Massachusetts Approach.
In contrast to other state courts, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court took a more nuanced approach in assessing the public
purpose of a proposed stadium project. The state legislature
sought the court’s opinion on the constitutionality of a bill
authorizing a public authority to issue revenue bonds to finance a
massive infrastructure project that included the construction of
both an outdoor stadium and indoor arena.129 The court concluded
that a stadium may be for a public purpose if all aspects of the
project are “adequately governed by appropriate standards and
principles set out in the legislation.”130 The court reasoned that
special standards were necessary to guard the public interest
because a stadium is distinct from facilities more typically
provided by government, such as housing and transportation,
where the public objective and the means to achieve that objective
are well established.131 Absent these standards, the public stadium
was likely to subsidize private business,132 and “the facilities could
not be said to exist for a public purpose.”133
Applying this rule to the proposed legislation, the court
elaborated on what “appropriate standards and principals” might
See Poe v. Hillsborough Cty., 695 So.2d 672, 678 (Fla. 1997).
See id. at 678–79 (quoting the unpublished trial court opinion).
128 See id. at 676 (quoting State v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities
Dist., 89 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1956)) (differentiating between permissible incidental private
benefits and non-permissible predominant private benefits); CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1061
(“The fact that private ends are incidentally advanced is immaterial to determining whether
legislation furthers a public purpose.”).
129 In re Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 549–50 (Mass. 1969).
130 Id. at 558.
131 Id.
132 See id. (recognizing that the stadium “necessarily contemplate[s] a substantial use” by
private businesses).
133 Id.
126
127
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look like.134 Even though the bill mandated that the rent collected
must enable the authority to meet its obligations incurred in
connection with the facilities, the court determined that the
standards were too “vague and fragmentary.”135 Because the
project was prospective and a lease with a professional team had
yet to be executed, the court did not weigh the substantive merits
of the deal, but it did suggest that effective standards would
require the government to charge at least fair market rent.136
Without stronger statutory guidance and standards, as well as a
mechanism for reviewing compliance with those standards, the
court certified that the stadium project would not be for a public
purpose.137
Since In re Opinion of the Justices, the Massachusetts
legislature has crafted stadium bills to protect the public
interest.138 Two stadium bills that provided public money for
professional teams limited the use of public funds to infrastructure
and utility improvements and required the teams to make
contributions so that the government was ensured a return on its
investment.139 In the separate yet related context of an eminent
domain taking to build a stadium, a lower court applied the In re
Opinion of the Justices decision to invalidate the taking because
the private use of the stadium outweighed its public use.140
IV. THE BRAVES-COBB COUNTY STADIUM DEAL
The November 2013 announcement came as a surprise to all
but the select few who had participated in the early, secret
negotiations.141 The Braves, who had played their home games in
Id.
Id. at 559.
136 See id. at 559–60 (finding that guidance fell short because it lacked a requirement that
the stadium authority charge the stadium’s users fair market rent).
137 Id. at 560.
138 See Steven Chen, Keeping Public Use Relevant in Stadium Eminent Domain Takings:
The Massachusetts Way, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 453, 471–74 (2013) (arguing that the
Massachusetts courts’ “insistence on the traditional analysis of public use to justify stadium
projects” has effectively constrained stadium legislation).
139 Id. at 473–74.
140 City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., 2000 WL 782971, at *50 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2000).
141 See Mike Tierney, Braves Begin Work on Stadium Outside Downtown Atlanta, to
Mixed
Reaction,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/sports/baseball/braves-begin-work-on-stadium-outside134
135
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downtown Atlanta since moving to the city from Milwaukee, were
packing their bags for the suburbs to play in a new stadium being
built in Cobb County (Cobb).142 Although the existing ballpark was
only eighteen years old, Braves officials were adamant that the
facility needed “hundreds of millions of upgrades” to “improve
access [and] the fan experience.”143 And, after eighteen months of
negotiations, it became clear that the city of Atlanta was unwilling
to foot the bill.144 Cobb, on the other hand, had promised to issue
up to $397 million in municipal bonds to finance construction of
the new stadium.145 While other factors influenced the team’s
decision,146 the public money Cobb offered likely sealed the deal.147
A. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

While many Cobb residents initially welcomed the stadium, a
University of Florida poll indicated that an overwhelming majority
wished county officials had held a referendum on the stadium.148
Cobb chairman Tim Lee claims to have considered putting the
question to the voters.149 There is, however, reason to doubt the
sincerity of this claim because the three-party agreement between
the Authority,150 Cobb, and the Braves appears structured
downtown-atlanta-to-mixed-reaction.html?_r=0 (characterizing the negotiations as “secret”
and noting that the announcement “stunned metropolitan Atlanta”).
142 Id.
143 See Greg Botelho, Atlanta Mayor Says Price to Keep Braves in City Limits Was Too
Steep, CNN (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/12/us/atlanta-braves-move/
(quoting Braves president John Schuerholz).
144 See id. (quoting a press release from Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed) (“We wanted the
Braves to stay in Atlanta, but (there was a) business problem that we had to solve.”).
145 Tierney, supra note 141.
146 See, e.g., Tierney, supra note 141 (noting that one of the Braves stated reasons for the
move was to be closer to its heaviest ticket base in Atlanta’s northern suburbs).
147 See Houston Barber, The Fall of Turner Field and Why Baseball in the Suburbs is Bad
News for Us All, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/houstonbarber/the-fall-of-turner-field-_b_9612302.html (arguing that the “unprecedented” offer
from Cobb was the main reason for the move).
148 See Tierney, supra note 141 (citing a poll that 78% of Cobb voters would have
preferred a referendum and that 55% would have voted for the bonds).
149 See id. (“Tim Lee, the Cobb County chairman who steered negotiations with the
Braves said . . . a vote had been considered . . . .”).
150 The Authority was created in 1980 as a “subordinate public corporation of the State of
Georgia for the purpose of development and promotion in this state of the cultural growth,
public welfare, education, and recreation of the people of this state.” Savage v. State, 774
S.E.2d 624, 627 (Ga. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Since then, it has overseen the
construction and management of a shopping mall and a performing arts center. Id. at 628.
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specifically to bypass the debt limitation clause in the Georgia
Constitution that requires municipal borrowings to be approved by
a voter referendum.151
To understand why the Braves stadium bonds were not subject
to the referendum requirement, it is necessary to understand the
terms of the agreement and the financial structure of the project.
Befitting a complex public-private joint venture, the project is
governed by nine separate contracts.152 A Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)—similar to a letter of intent—was executed
in November 2013.153 Although the MOU indicated agreement on
key terms, it acknowledged that it was not the final agreement
and that the parties contemplated several more definitive
agreements,154 including the Development Agreement, Operating
Agreement, Bond Resolution, Intergovernmental Agreement, and
Trust Indenture.155 These agreements were signed six months
later, immediately following the Cobb County Commission’s
unanimous approval of the project.156
Article 6 of the Development Agreement details the financing
arrangement.157 The Authority issued $368 million in revenue
bonds, Cobb directly provided $14 million in infrastructure
improvements, and the Braves contributed the rest—between $230
and $280 million depending on the final project costs.158 Once
completed, the Authority would own all the real property and

151 See GA. CONST. art. 9, § 5, para. 1(a)(2016) (“[N]o such county, municipality, or other
political subdivision shall incur any new debt without the assent of a majority of the
qualified voters of such county.”).
152 COBB
CTY.
GOV’T,
BRAVES
AGREEMENTS,
https://cobbcounty.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5790:bravesagreements&catid=606&Itemid=2153 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
153 Id.
154 See id. at 2 (“This MOU is not intended as a complete and final agreement governing
these matters, and the Parties intend to execute one or more final agreements to govern
these matters in greater detail.”).
155 COBB
CTY. GOV’T, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Nov. 27, 2013),
https://cobbcounty.org/images/documents/communications/13975-BravesMOU.pdf
[hereinafter COBB CTY. GOV’T, MOU]; Savage v. State, 774 S.E.2d 624, 628–31 (Ga. 2015)
(listing the five “main agreements”).
156 Klepal, supra note 8.
157 COBB
CTY. GOV’T, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (May 27, 2014), at 23–28,
https://cobbcounty.org/images/documents/boc/braves/Resolution%20for%20Development%20
Agreement.pdf.
158 See id. at Exhibit C (showing that the Braves contributed $230 million plus an
additional $50 million in discretionary funds).
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public infrastructure at the site while the Braves would own the
stadium improvements.159
At first glance, it appears that Cobb’s financial obligation
limited to only the $14 million in infrastructure improvements
while the Authority is the primary financier of the stadium. The
Authority’s enabling legislation authorizes it to undertake
“projects”—defined to include the construction and operation of
“facilities to be used for athletic contests”160 and to issue revenue
bonds to finance these projects.161 The ability to issue debt
obligations is meaningless, however, if the issuer lacks the means
to repay the debt, and the Authority does not have the power to
independently levy taxes.162 Requiring the Braves to repay the
debt from stadium revenues would negate the primary motivation
for moving stadiums.163 Moreover, even under the most optimistic
projections, additional taxes attributable to the project would not
come close to covering the annual debt service payments.164
To come up with the funds to repay the bonds, the parties
exploited a loophole in Georgia public finance law. As authorized
by the Georgia Constitution,165 Cobb and the Authority entered
into the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). Per the terms of the
IGA, Cobb is required to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the
annual debt service payments into a trust using “any funds
lawfully available to it.”166 This includes an obligation to levy new
ad valorem property taxes if necessary to meet its contractual
obligation.167 Although the Authority is seemingly the main
Id. at 26.
Savage v. State, 774 S.E.2d 624, 627 (Ga. 2015) (quoting 1980 Ga. Laws 4096, § (5)(2)).
161 Id.
162 See GA. CONST. art. 9, § 6, para. 1 (2016) (“No such issuing political subdivision shall
exercise the power of taxation for purpose of paying any part of the principal or interest of
any such revenue bonds.”).
163 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (opining that the public money approved by
Cobb for the stadium was the primary motivation for the Braves move).
164 See COBB CTY. GOV’T, ECONOMIC BENEFITS SUMMARY, supra note 32 (“Operation of the
ballpark will generate nearly $2 million in annual tax collections for the County.”
BRAILSFORD & DUNLAVEY, supra note 33 at 3. And the annual debt repayment figures is
$22.4 million. Klepal, supra note 3).
165 See GA. CONST. art. 9, § 3, para. 1(a) (authorizing counties to contract with public
authorities for “joint services, for the provision of services, or for the joint or separate use of
facilities” for a period not exceeding 50 years).
166 COBB CTY GOV’T, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT §§ 5.1, 5.2.
167 See id. at § 5.2 (explaining that if pre-existing tax revenues earmarked for the stadium
are insufficient to meet Cobb’s payment obligations under the IGA, then Cobb agreed to
levy an additional ad valorem property tax).
159
160
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government sponsor of the project, in reality it is was only a
conduit used by Cobb to issue the bonds and to serve as the
nominal owner of the real property at the stadium site.
Once the bonds were issued, Cobb’s liability was finalized. In
addition to the $14 million in upfront infrastructure
improvements, Cobb’s taxpayers will pay $22.4 million annually
over thirty years to repay the bonds issued to finance stadium
construction, which is partially offset by the Braves $6.1 million in
annual rent payments.168 To cover this recurring expenditure,
Cobb increased property taxes by .23 mills.169 Except for the
Braves rent and sales taxes, neither Cobb nor the Authority is
entitled to any revenue generated by the stadium,170 but they are
obligated to contribute up to $35 million over thirty years for
capital maintenance and repairs.171
B. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN: FINANCING THE STADIUM WITH TAXABLE
MUNICIPAL BONDS

Unlike other publicly-financed stadiums, the Braves stadium
bonds are not exempt from federal income taxation.172 While the
decision to issue taxable, rather than tax-exempt, bonds made the
project as a whole more expensive,173 due to the idiosyncrasies of
the federal tax code, it also allowed Cobb to secure a greater
contribution from the Braves to repay the debt. Current federal
law forces municipalities to make a trade-off between paying back
at least 90% of the borrowing costs and foregoing the federal tax
subsidy. The general rule is that the interest earned on state and
local bonds is excluded from gross income for federal taxes
purposes, unless the bonds qualify as private activity bonds under
section 141(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.174 The Braves
Klepal, supra note 3.
Id.
170 COBB CTY. GOV’T, MOU, supra note 155, at 7. This includes the reportedly $10 million
a year SunTrust Bank pays for the naming rights. Sources: Braves’ Naming-Rights Deal
with SunTrust Worth More Than $10M Annually, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Sept. 17, 2014),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2014/09/17/Facilities/Braves.aspx.
171 COBB CTY. GOV’T, MOU, supra note 155, at 8.
172 See Meredith Hobbs, Cobb’s Bonds Close for Braves Stadium, DAILY REPORT (FULTON
CTY. GA.) (Sept. 14, 2015) (announcing the closing of the sale period for $376.6 million in
AAA-rated taxable bonds that are fixed-rate, payable over thirty years).
173 See Gayer et al., supra note 28 at 27 (noting that interest rates are approximate 0.5%
higher for taxable bonds than their tax-exempt counterparts).
174 I.R.C. § 103(a), (b) (2012).
168
169
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stadiums bonds, however, are not tax-exempt because they qualify
as private activity bonds under section 141(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code.175 Bonds are private activity bonds if they meet
both the private use and private payment tests.176 As with all
other stadium bonds, the Braves’ bonds meet the private use test
because the privately-owned team’s use of the facility will far
exceed the 10% threshold. Unlike other stadium bond issuances,
where the team pays no more than 10% of the debt service
payments,177 the Braves are paying $6.1 million of the $22.1
million annual amount required to repay the bondholders.178
Because the privately-owned team is responsible for 27% of the
annual debt service payments, the bonds pass both the private use
and private payment tests and are, therefore, taxable private
activity bonds.
Although using private activity bonds enabled Cobb to charge
the Braves a higher rent, it also made the project as a whole more
expensive because taxable bonds carry a higher interest rate than
comparable tax-exempt bonds.179 The Braves stadium bonds carry
an interest rate of 4.4%, which results in an annual bond
repayment of $22.4 million.180 While it is impossible to know the
market interest rate for the hypothetical tax-exempt Braves
stadium bonds, the average of comparable tax-exempt municipal
bonds provides a good approximation. In 2015, the average
interest rate on AA-rated tax-exempt municipal debt obligations
maturing in twenty years was 3.65%.181 Our hypothetical taxexempt Braves stadium bonds paying 3.65% interest would lead to
an annual debt repayment of $20.4 million. So the decision to issue

I.R.C. §§ 103(b), 141(b).
See I.R.C. § 141(a) (“[T]he term ‘private activity bond’ means any bond . . . which
meets the private business use test . . . and . . . the private security or payment test . . . .”),
supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing the private use and private payment
tests).
177 See, e.g., Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Wis. 1996) (noting that the
team’s rent was exactly 10% of the total annual payment to be made by the bond issuing
governmental authority).
178 COBB CTY. GOV’T, MOU, supra note 155 at 9.
179 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing why taxable bonds carry a
higher interest rate).
180 Klepal, supra note 3.
181 WM
FINANCIAL
STRATEGIES,
The
20-Bond
Index:
2008–2017,
http://www.munibondadvisor.com/market.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2016).
175
176
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taxable bonds cost approximately $2 million per year or $60
million over the life of the bonds.
From Cobb’s perspective, this trade-off made sense because it
was able to pass all of the additional costs of issuing taxable bonds
to the Braves in the form of higher rent. To avoid the private
activity bond classification under this hypothetical, the Braves’
maximum contribution would have been just over $2 million with
Cobb left paying the remaining $18 million, roughly $1.7 million
more than the $16.3 million they are paying under the actual
agreement.182 While just a hypothetical based on a set of
assumptions, Cobb officials presumably conducted a similar
analysis when they were structuring the deal. Furthermore, it is
not difficult to see how minor changes to the assumptions could
alter the trade-off. For example, if the interest rate spread
between taxable and tax-exempt bonds was 2%, as it had been in
the 1990s,183 the annual payment to repay the fictional, taxexempt bonds would have been $16.9 million. Under that scenario,
Cobb would have been better off lowering the Braves’ rent and
issuing tax-exempt bonds.
C. THE LAWSUIT: SAVAGE V. STATE

Georgia law requires all revenue bonds to be validated by a trial
court.184 Citizens for Governmental Transparency, an advocacy
group opposed to the new stadium, joined the Braves stadium
bond validation proceedings.185 The trial court confirmed and
validated the bonds, but three Cobb taxpayers appealed directly to
the Georgia Supreme Court alleging that the bond issuance
violated Georgia constitutional and statutory provisions.186
Although remarking that “aspects of the deal structure at issue
may push the law about as far as it can go,”187 the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, and the project
was allowed to proceed.188

See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating Cobb’s share of the obligation).
See supra note 61.
184 O.C.G.A. § 36-82-73 (2012).
185 Tierney, supra note 141; see also O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77 (“Any citizen of this
state . . . may become a party to the proceedings . . . .”).
186 Savage v. State, 774 S.E.2d 624, 630 (Ga. 2015).
187 Id. at 641.
188 Id. at 630.
182
183
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The bonds’ compliance with the debt limitation clause and
revenue bond statute hinged on whether the intergovernmental
agreement (IGA) between the Authority and Cobb was valid.189
The IGA complied because its term was for less than fifty years
and it was between two political subdivisions for “joint services”
that the governmental entities were authorized by law to
provide.190 The court held that “debt incurred under a valid
intergovernmental contract is not subject to the debt limitation
clause” because the intergovernmental contracts clause is
essentially a carve-out to other constitutional provisions.191 In
reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the extent of Cobb’s
liability under the agreement. It correctly noted that Cobb was
obligated to pay hundreds of millions of dollars over a thirty year
period, but that liability was contractual in nature and not directly
tied to the bonds themselves.192 While this distinction may seem
arbitrary, it accords with basic principles of contract law. Cobb is
not a party to the bond contract, the Bond Resolution agreement
expressly disclaims any potential liability Cobb might have under
a theory that the bondholders were intended third-party
beneficiaries of the IGA.193 Cobb’s only potential liability would be
directly to the Authority if it breached the IGA.
The court found further support for its holding by citing
extensive precedent and appealing to the power of precedent
itself.194 Although it is easy to be contemptuous of high-powered
lawyers exploiting small exceptions in the law, the parties
structured their relationship in view of the law at the time and to
change it ex post would harm the parties’ reliance interest.195
Moreover, as the court noted, intergovernmental contracts are
often used to provide essential government services such as

See id. at 631 (listing the four requirements for a valid intergovernmental agreement).
Id. at 631–34.
191 Id. at 635.
192 Id.
193 See id. (“[T]he Bond Resolution expressly declares that the bonds shall not
constitute . . . an obligation, debt, or a pledge . . . of the [c]ounty . . . .”) (internal quotations
omitted).
194 See id. at 636 (“[S]tare decisis is especially important where judicial decisions create
substantial reliance interests, as is common with rulings involving contract and property
rights.”).
195 See id. at 637 (“A ruling that intergovernmental contracts are no longer an exception
to the debt limitation clause would affect every intergovernmental agreement . . . .”).
189
190
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hospitals, roads, and public safety and it would be impractical to
require voter approval for these types of agreements. 196
In addition to avoiding the debt limitation clause, the court
ruled that the IGA effectively satisfied the revenue bond law that
limits repayment to revenues derived from the project.197 Georgia
revenue bond law states that repayment must come solely from
“the revenue pledged to the payment thereof,”198—defined as “all
revenues, income, and earnings arising out of or in connection with
the operation or ownership of the undertaking . . . .199 While the
rent paid by the Braves is certainly a revenue connected to the
“operation or ownership of the undertaking,” it is difficult to see
how Cobb’s contribution, sourced from a countywide property tax
increase, is a revenue tied to the stadium. Put in the context of the
court’s analysis, however, this interpretation is at least plausible.
Cobb’s authorization to provide the “joint services” (the stadium) is
predicated on its constitutional authority to provide “[p]arks,
recreational areas, programs, and facilities”200 as well as its
authority to use general revenues to fund permissible projects like
parks.201
While conceptually this makes sense, Cobb is still spending a
significant amount of money to provide a “recreational facility”
that will only be enjoyed by a small, relatively wealthy subset of
its residents. Interestingly, the appellants’ did not allege that the
bonds violated Georgia’s public purpose rule.202 Instead, they
argued that the stadium violated the constitutional directive that
a county may only expend funds for public functions,203 relitigating
Id.
See id. at 638 (“This Court has repeatedly held that when revenue bonds are
contemplated as part of a valid intergovernmental contract, payments made under the
contract constitute project revenue.”).
198 O.C.G.A. § 36-82-66 (2012).
199 O.C.G.A. § 36-82-61(3); see also GA. CONST. art. IX, § 6, para. 1 (2016) (“The obligation
represented by revenue bonds shall be repayable only out of the revenue derived from the
project . . . .”).
200 See Savage v. State, 774 S.E.2d 624, 632 (Ga. 2015) (quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2,
para. 3(a)(5)) (finding that a stadium qualifies as a type of recreational facility the county is
authorized to provide under its constitutional powers).
201 Id. at 633.
202 See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (discussing Georgia’s public purpose
doctrine).
203 Savage, 774 S.E.2d at 633 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 4, para. 2) (2016) (alleging that
the expenditure is not for a public function because the Braves will have exclusive control
over the stadium).
196
197
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the issue of whether a professional baseball stadium is a
“recreational facility” that the county is authorized to provide for
its citizens. Nevertheless, the court conducted a cursory public
purpose analysis similar to the ones conducted in Libertarian
Party, CLEAN, and Poe.204 Operating under an “abuse of
discretion” standard,205 the court deferred to Cobb’s
pronouncement that the stadium will provide significant economic
and intangible benefits to its residents.206 The Braves’ anticipated
benefit from exclusive use of the stadium would not defeat the
stadium’s purported public benefit.207 While this is consistent with
the majority view, other jurisdictions insist that a stadium subsidy
must serve a “predominant public purpose”208 and that any private
benefits to the team are “incidental” to the “paramount public
purpose.”209 In contrast, the Georgia court suggested that any
public benefit is sufficient, whether it is disproportionate to the
private benefit or not.210
Furthermore, the decision illustrates modern courts’ propensity
to conflate public benefit with public purpose.211 This effectively
renders the public purpose rule superfluous. In Loan Association v.
Topeka, the United States Supreme Court held that bonds issued
by the city under a state statute intended to promote
manufacturing development because they were not for a public
purpose were payable directly to a manufacturer.212 The Court
reasoned that any private business, in employing capital and
labor, creates some public benefit.213 By putting money into the
204 See supra note 126–130 and accompanying text (discussing three cases that exemplify
the predominant judicial application of the public purpose rule to stadium subsidies).
205 See Savage, 774 S.E.2d at 634 (holding that “unless there is an abuse of discretion . . .
courts should not substitute their judgment or interfere with governing authorities”
(quoting Smith v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 259 S.E.2d 74, 79 (Ga. 1979)).
206 See id. at 633–34 (discussing Cobb’s determination that the project will catalyze
redevelopment in the area, promote tourism, benefit the economy, and provide recreational
benefits).
207 Id. at 634.
208 Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Wis. 1996)
209 Poe v. Hillsborough Cty., 695 So. 2d 672, 675 (Fla. 1997).
210 See Savage, 774 S.E.2d at 633 (rejecting the assertion that the private benefits to the
Braves “eliminated any public benefits”) (emphasis added).
211 See Rubin, supra note 76, at 418 (arguing that this conflation removes a key limit on
public spending).
212 See 87 U.S. 655, 664–65 (1874) (“It is . . . the duty of the legislature which imposes or
authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to be used for purposes of
private interest instead of a public use . . . .”).
213 See id. at 665 (listing other businesses that are “equally promoters of the public good”).
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economy, any government expenditure is going to have some
public benefit, whether that benefit is widespread or warrants the
payment of tax money are entirely separate questions.
The court in Savage paid minimal attention to the claim that
Cobb violated the lending of credit clause.214 According to the
court, because the Development Agreement ensured that no public
money would be used to acquire, improve, or alter the Braves
private property, the project did not violate the lending of credit
clause.215 The Development Agreement grants the Braves
ownership of the stadium improvements in exchange for the
Braves $290 million upfront contribution. But the stadium’s “hard”
construction costs were budgeted at $482 million.216 The $192
million difference between the construction costs and the Braves
initial contribution is necessarily covered by the revenue bond
proceeds. Thus, the Authority and Cobb are lending their credit for
the Braves to acquire approximately 40% of the personal property
they will own in the stadium.
V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO PROTECT TAXPAYERS
Limiting public subsidies for professional sports stadiums will
be no easy task. As long as local politicians fear the political
ramifications of a beloved team skipping town and other cities
remain willing to open the public coffers to become “major league
cities,” the temptation to acquire in to demands for a publiclyfinanced stadium will persist. Leveling the playing field, will
require a combination of congressional, state legislative, and state
judicial actions. While Georgia is too late as all three of its major
pro sports teams are either completing major renovations or
moving into new stadiums in the next two years, its mistakes can
serve as an example for other jurisdictions confronted with teams
demanding publicly-financed stadiums.

214
215
216

See supra note 97 (stating Georgia’s lending of credit clause).
Savage, 774 S.E.2d at 637–38.
COBB CTY., DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 157, at 24 Exhibit C.
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A. REMOVING THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION

Although the recent tax bill signed into law by President Trump
did nothing to close “30-year-old tax loophole”217 created by
exempting the interest rate on stadium bonds from federal
taxation.218 Congress should revisit the issue and pass a provision
similar to what was in an early draft of the House Republicans tax
bill.219 The subsidy is not economically justified because
professional sports do not exhibit economies of scale, thus
defeating any natural monopoly justification like that is given for a
public utility.220 Further, economic research shows limited
spillover gains from subsidizing stadiums.221 Even if stadiums
stimulated local economies, it is unfair to require a taxpayer in one
state to fund local stadiums in other states that they will derive no
benefit from.222 While only representing a drop in the bucket for
the federal treasury, stadium bonds have reduced tax revenues by
nearly $4 billion since 2000.223
Recognizing the political opposition to changing the federal tax
code, 224 legal scholars have put forward moderate alternatives
that might be more palatable to legislators while still limiting the
federal subsidy. One proposal would allow renovations to existing
stadiums to be financed through tax-exempt bonds subject to an
existing $225 million cap for qualified private activity bonds.225 An
even more moderate proposal would essentially undo the changes
made in 1986 and allow bonds for new stadiums to be tax-exempt,
subject to the qualified private activity cap.226 At a minimum, if

217 PRESS RELEASE, CONGRESSMAN STEVE RUSSELL, Congressman Russell Introduces Bill
to End 30-Year-Old Tax Loophole (Mar. 23, 2016), https://russell.house.gov/mediacenter/pressreleases/congressman-russell-introduces-bill-end-30-year-old-tax-loophole.
218 Watson, supra note 77.
219 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 3604 (2017).
220 See Gayer et al., supra note 28, at 5.
221 See id. (“The evidence for large spillover gains from stadiums to the local economic is
weak. Academic studies consistently find no discernible positive relationship between sports
facility construction and local economic development, income growth, or job criteria.”).
222 Id. at 6.
223 See id. at 4 (“[T]he present value federal tax revenue loss was $3.7 billion . . . .”).
224 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing two previous failed bills and the
constituencies that oppose changes to the federal tax code).
225 See I.R.C. § 146(d) (2012) (imposing a $225 million cap on the total amount of private
activity bonds that a state or local government agency can issue in a year); Gans, supra note
10, at 784 (arguing for this cap to be extended to stadium bonds).
226 See Goodman, supra note 32, at 217 (describing Dennis Zimmerman’s proposal).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

31

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 10
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

438

12/18/2018 11:27 AM

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:407

stadium bonds are going to be tax-exempt, the private payment
test that exerts pressure on local governments to assume 90% of
the repayment burden should be eliminated.227
Although the taxable bonds used to finance the Braves stadium
prove that eliminating the federal tax exemption will not
completely solve the problem, it is a good place to start. Part of the
appeal of municipal bonds for teams is that it lowers their total
cost of capital by enabling them to access lower interest debt
through their local government. While teams are unlikely to turn
down a government handout, if local governments cannot access
the tax-exempt municipal bond market to subsidize stadiums, the
principle advantage of municipal bond financing will be eliminated
and teams will gradually gravitate to lower cost alternatives.
B. STATE LEGISLATION SETTING CLEAR STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Any political backlash over the amount of Cobb’s contribution to
build the stadium was overshadowed by the public outcry that the
negotiation and approval process lacked transparency and public
involvement.228 This underscores the need for legislation that
provides both procedural and substantive standards to protect the
public interest. Legislative guidance is necessary because
professional sports stadiums are unlike other public facilities.229
Although the fiscal benefits are overstated, professional sports
teams are valuable assets to local communities. But the public
objective and the means to achieve it are murky and closely
intertwined with the naked self-interest of powerful team owners.
This recognition led the Massachusetts court to conclude that a
public stadium project would not be in the public interest unless
accompanied by standards and procedures that ensured public
oversight and constrained local government’s ability to capitulate
to pressure derived from the team’s bargaining advantage.230

227 See supra notes 172–181 and accompanying text (discussing the difficult calculus
municipalities must perform in deciding whether to issue taxable or tax-exempt bonds).
228 See Klepal, supra note 8 (noting that stadium opponents were not saved speaking slots
at an open meeting and key documents were only made available days before the final vote).
229 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969) (contrasting
essential public facilities like housing and mass transit where “the public objectives are well
understood” with stadiums where there is “not as clearly and directly a public purpose”).
230 Id.
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In Georgia, the only guidance was the nearly twenty-five-yearold law that authorized the Authority to construct athletic
facilities and the standard validation process required by the
revenue bond law.231 While these may be sufficient to protect the
public interest when applied to ordinary government functions like
building roads, the public backlash that resulted in the chairman
of the Cobb Commission being voted out of office, in what was
widely viewed as a belated referendum on the stadium, clearly
shows that Cobb taxpayers felt taken advantage of.232 Simply
legislating special stadium districts will not prevent unpopular
stadium subsides if that legislation does not impose rigorous
standards that subject to independent oversight.233 States should
adopt the Massachusetts approach that limits public expenditures
and requires the project as a whole to provide a reasonable return
on the public’s investment.234
C. MORE ROBUST JUDICIAL REVIEW

Massachusetts also stands out for adhering to the more
traditional public purpose analysis employed by most states until
the middle of the twentieth century.235 The current majority view
grants broad deference to local governments’ conclusion that a
public stadium project furthers a valid public purpose.236 While
there are valid policy reasons to limit judicial oversight of the
terms of the agreements reached by local governments and pro
sports teams,237 those must be balanced with an appreciation of
the unequal bargaining power professional teams have over
municipalities and the need to enforce state constitutional
doctrines enacted to prevent public credit from being used for
predominantly private gain. As the analysis in Savage suggests,
See supra notes 182–183,198–200 and accompanying text.
Meris Lutz, Cobb County Voters Send Lee Packing; Boyce Elected New Chairman,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 27, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/cobbcounty-voters-send-lee-packing-boyce-elected-new-chairman/amm2QpAS9oVjtaozOwvfXP/.
233 See CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996) and Libertarian Party v. State, 546
N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996), both states created special stadium districts subject to legislative
regulation and oversight that proved ineffective in limiting the public money that flowed to
the privately owned teams.
234 See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text (detailing the types of standards that
have been effective in Massachusetts).
235 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
231
232
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teams and local governments are adept at exploiting loopholes in
public finance law—many of which serve legitimate functions in
other contexts—to avoid debt limitation clauses, the lending of
credit doctrine, and the public purpose rule.238 Absent legislation
providing more specific guidance and standards that
municipalities must comply with before approving public money to
build pro sports stadiums, these doctrines will likely continue to be
ineffective. But, as the Massachusetts court proved, that does not
necessarily mean that state courts must cede the floor and allow
taxpayer money to be spent for the benefit of private professional
sports teams.
VI. CONCLUSION
The billions of dollars that American taxpayers have spent
since the turn of the century to repay municipal bonds issued to
subsidize professional sports stadiums poses a curious type of
problem. Everyone seems to agree it is a problem, but nobody can
muster the will to remedy it. The last congressional action in 1986
only exacerbated the pressure local governments face to agree to
teams’ demands for subsidized stadiums. While removing the
federal tax exemption is a common sense reform, Congress seems
to lack the political will to act. Furthermore, as the Braves
stadium bonds show, changes to the tax code alone are insufficient
to limit subsidies. The complex agreement between Cobb, the
Authority, and the Braves and the ensuing litigation made
apparent that teams and local governments have discovered ways
around the state constitutional provisions enacted to prevent
gratuitous public aid to private businesses. And state courts, with
one exception, are disinclined to reign this practice in. The best
way forward first requires state legislatures and courts to
acknowledge that public stadiums are unlike other government
provided facilities and, as such, must be treated differently by the
law. By requiring municipalities to affirmatively show in court
that a stadium project is indeed in the public interest and that it
complies with state legislative standings and guidance specific to
the stadium context, the playing field that is currently titled
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See supra Section IV.C.
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strongly in favor of pro sports teams’ extracting overly generous
subsidies to build their stadiums will begin to become more equal.
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